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Abstract: Did global imbalances cause the financial crisis? A number 
of influential figures have argued that inflows of foreign capital into 
the US due to the current account deficit helped to trigger the crisis. 
This paper argues that the evidence for this position is weak. The 
capital inflows into the US associated with the current account deficit 
were also not the key factor driving foreign purchases of US toxic 
assets. The so-called global savings glut was not as significant a 
pattern as is often presented. Macroeconomic policies that reduced 
global imbalances could have been adopted but these would 
probably not have prevented the crisis. Global policy efforts to 
prevent a recurrence of the financial crisis need to focus on improved 




                                                 
1 This is a briefing paper delivered by the author, in his role as a member of an Expert Panel of advisors, to 
the European Parliament’s Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs in relation to its Monetary 
Dialogue with the European Central Bank. 1. Were Global Imbalances the Real Culpit? 
 
Now that the intense disruptions associated with the global financial crisis 
appear to have largely passed, there has been a lot of analysis in 
international policy and academic circles of the period that lead up to the 
crisis, as people try to understand its root causes. The failure of financial 
regulatory frameworks has been the most common point for discussion and 
these failures are already being addressed around the world: The G20 have 
outlined an ambitious agenda for new global standards for banking 
regulation and many governments around the world are reassessing their 
approaches to dealing with financial crises. 
 
Beyond the issues relating to financial regulation, however, a number of 
high profile academics and policy figures have also suggested that we need 
to look for other, perhaps deeper, underlying factors that led to the financial 
crisis and a number of them have suggested that the global imbalances that 
prevailed in the years prior to the crisis were a key contributing factor.  
 
To give a few examples, ECB Executive Board member, Lorenzo Bini-
Smaghi (2008) suggested not long after the onset of the most serious stage of 
the crisis that the financial crisis and global imbalances were “two sides of 
the same coin”. Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of Canada, believes that 
“Current account imbalances across major economic areas were integral to 
the build-up of vulnerabilities in many asset markets.” In an extensive 
November 2009 paper, Maurice Obstfeld and Kenneth Rogoff argued that 
global imbalances and the financial crisis were “intimately connected.” 
Perhaps most strongly, Richard Portes (2009), President of the Centre for Economic Policy Research, has stated that “global macroeconomic 
imbalances are the underlying cause of the crisis.”   
 
If these arguments are correct, then the fact that these global imbalances 
have not gone away should be a major source of concern for global 
economic policy leaders. While the US trade deficit has declined since the 
onset of the recession and surpluses from oil-exporting countries have fallen 
substantially, this US trade gap remains large and the sources of its funding 
have not changed too much. Does this mean that global policy makers need 
to focus on exchange rate and aggregate demand policies to reduce these 
imbalances if we are to avoid another crisis? 
 
In my opinion (put somewhat reluctantly in view of the eminence of some of 
the figures in favour of this position) the evidence does not justify this 
conclusion. While there were certainly some common factors driving both 
asset prices and current account developments, a review of the years prior to 
the crisis does not suggest that macroeconomic policies aimed at reducing 
global imbalances would have prevented the crisis. 
 
The rest of the paper focuses on three issues. First, I discuss whether the 
financial flows associated with global imbalances played an important role 
in the financial crisis that stemmed from toxic US securities. Second, I turn 
to the question of whether macroeconomic policies aimed at reducing global 
imbalances would have prevented the global financial crisis. Third, I discuss 
arguments for greater international policy co-ordination on macroeconomic 
policies.  A concluding section argues that while greater global 
macroeconomic co-ordination is desirable, better global financial regulation is going to be the key area to focus on if we want to prevent future financial 
crises of the type just experienced. 
 
2. Net Versus Gross Financial Flows 
 
2.1 Net Financial Flows 
 
When thinking about the linkages between global imbalances and the recent 
financial crisis, I think it is worth distinguishing here between correlation 
and causation. There is little doubt that some of the factors that led to the 
global financial crisis also exacerbated existing global imbalances. In 
particular, loose financial regulation allowing easier credit standards for 
mortgage borrowing was certainly a factor in sustaining the rise in house 
prices in the US and other countries with housing bubbles, and the increased 
spending triggered by these bubbles contributed to current account deficits. 
But this is a correlation. The causal factor runs from poor financial 
regulation to both global imbalances and the financial crisis. 
 
What about causal links in the other direction, running from global 
imbalances to the financial crisis? To give an example, Portes (2009) argues 
that global imbalances “brought low interest rates, the search for yield, and 
an excessive volume of financial intermediation, which the system could not 
handle responsibly.” Advocates of this position emphasise the fact that US 
current account deficits were financed with inflows of foreign money that 
ended up being allocated poorly. For instance, Obstfeld and Rogoff (2009) noted that “Foreign banks’ appetite for assets that turned out to be toxic 
provided one ready source of external funding for the U.S. deficit.” 
 
This focus on inflows of foreign capital into the US as a source of the 
financial crisis is a natural one. The US current account deficit in the years 
prior to the crisis grew to historically unprecedented levels, peaking at $800 
billion dollars (six percent of GDP) in 2006 (see Figure 1). One might 
imagine that the financing of this very large deficit was the major factor 
underlying capital inflows into the US during the pre-crisis period. Indeed, 
Portes (2009) argued that global imbalances “contributed strongly to a sharp 
rise in the volume of financial transactions.” 
 
2.2. Gross Financial Flows 
 
Despite the apparent plausibility of the story in which financial flows 
associated with the US current account deficit fuelled the financial crisis, I 
believe there are a number of problems with this explanation. In particular, a 
closer examination shows that the current account deficit did not play a 
dominant role in determining financial inflows into the US during the pre-
crisis period.  
 
To understand why this is the case, it is necessary to distinguish between net 
and gross financial flows. Financial flows involving reallocation of assets 
across countries can occur in the absence any current account deficits. For 
instance, French citizens may purchase $10 billion in US government bonds 
while US corporations invest $10 billion in foreign direct investment in 
French companies. These may be large gross flows but they cancel out when calculating the bilateral capital account between the US and France.  
Alternatively, a bilateral current account deficit of $10 billion may occur 
because trade flows lead to French citizens purchasing $30 billion in US 





















As has been widely documented, most importantly in the work of Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti (2007), the period since the mid-1990s has seen a rapid 
acceleration of financial globalisation. The loosening of financial restrictions 
has allowed people around the world to broaden their portfolios of assets 
beyond those available domestically and this has seen a huge increase in 
financial flows.  
 For the United States during the pre-crisis period, the gross flows associated 
with financial globalisation were considerably larger than the net changes 
associated with current account deficits. The period from 2002-2007 saw US 
external liabilities rise from 83% of GDP to 147% of GDP. However, only 
about one-third of this could be accounted for by the accumulated trade 
deficits which required US citizens to increase their indebtedness to the rest 
of the world. The rest was accounted for by financial globalisation. So, over 
the same period, US external assets also rose from 63% of GDP in 2002 to 
131% of GDP in 2007. Figure 2 illustrates these trends using data from Lane 
and Milesi-Ferretti’s External Wealth of Nations dataset. 
 
These figures show that even if the US was not running a trade deficit at all 
during the 1990s, there would have been plenty of foreign funds coming into 
the US financial markets.  
 
It is perhaps instructive to also consider two specific examples that help to 
explain why there was, at best, a weak connection between the US current 
account deficit and the financial crisis.  
 
Europe: Obstfeld and Rogoff (2009) discuss the purchase of toxic US 
mortgage-backed securities (MBS) by foreign banks. Obstfeld and Rogoff 
describe these purchases as “a ready source of external funding for the U.S. 
deficit.”  However, as the opening months of the financial crisis showed, 
European banks played a major role in this process, with many of them 
getting into serious financial trouble when the toxic nature of the sub-prime 
MBS became clear.  This was a major mechanism for transmitting US 
problems into a full-scale European financial crisis.   
However, during this period, the EU had a relatively even trade balance with 
the United States.  Even in a world in which the US was running an even 
trade balance with the rest of the world as well as Europe, it is likely that the 
European banks that purchased US mortgage-backed securities would have 
continued to do so. 
 
China: In contrast to the European example, the years leading up to the 
crisis saw the US running ever bigger current account bilateral deficits with 
China. By 2007, this bilateral deficit had reached about $300 billion, which 
was roughly two percent of US GDP. This very large bilateral deficit could, 
in theory, have been financed by Chinese purchases of the toxic securities 
that triggered the financial crisis. In reality, however, the Chinese purchased 
large amounts of US Treasury debt. 
 
To summarise, while it is certainly the case that the period prior to the crisis 
was associated with large net capital inflows into the United States, there is 
little evidence that this had a causal effect in relation to the financial crisis. 
The net capital inflows associated with the deficit were small relative to total 
capital inflows and the largest single source of this deficit (trade with China) 
did not lead to foreign funds being invested in risky toxic assets. 
 
3. Alternative  Macroeconomic  Policies 
 
The previous arguments suggest that the foreign capital inflows associated 
with the US current account deficit should not, on their own, be assigned an important role as a determining factor in the financial crisis. Obstfeld and 
Rogoff’s recent paper, however, focuses less on the fact of financial flows 
into the US and more on the idea that the macroeconomic policies that lead 
to the global imbalances also lead to the financial crisis. 
 
This is a complex argument. Global imbalances are a pattern in which some 
countries are spending more than they are producing while other countries 
are doing the opposite. The explanations for these patterns thus relate to a 
whole range of factors: They are a function of macroeconomic policies in 
both the deficit and the surplus countries as well as structural factors such as 
demographics, the extent of social safety nets and the reliability of financial 
markets. So, in practice, there were many different types of policy actions 
that could have reduced the size of global imbalances and it would be very 
difficult to figure out in each case whether these actions would have also 
reduced the risk of financial crisis.   
 
Here, I will restrict discussion to two examples of counterfactual 
macroeconomic policies that are often discussed: That US policy should 
have encouraged higher private savings and that Asian countries should 
encouraged lower savings. On balance, I think there is limited evidence to 
suggest that these measures would have prevented the financial crisis. 
 
3.1. Higher US Savings 
 
It is common now to suggest that the US should have adopted policies to 
promote higher private saving during the period prior to the financial crisis to damp down aggregate demand. This, it is argued, would have damped the 
rise in house prices, lead to less spending on foreign goods and thus lower 
capital inflows into the United States. For instance, Bini-Smaghi (2008) 
argued that “if the US had adopted measures to improve net savings, in 
particular by households, as suggested, the housing bubble would have been 
more limited and its bursting less dramatic.” 
 
On balance, I don’t find these arguments very convincing. The rise in US 
house prices had very little to do with macroeconomic fundamentals such as 
strong growth in GDP. During the peak years of the “Bush boom”, 2004-
2006, economic growth averaged a modest three percent per year. A 
reduction in this pace of growth towards a slightly more modest pace may 
not have had much effect on the dynamics underlying house prices. 
 
In addition, when thinking about the counterfactual in which US households 
saved more during the mid to late 2000s, one has to consider where those 
savings would have been put to use. US households have easy access to 
many different types of investment vehicles. For example, many households 
have access to their checking account online and can easily make transfers 
from this account to equity funds, money market mutual funds or more 
exotic instruments.  
 
If the US had adopted policies to encourage private savings, it is likely that 
much of this additional savings would have been channelled towards some 
of the toxic vehicles that helped to fund the housing bubble. Indeed, one 
could possibly argue that every dollar spent by US households on Chinese imports—subsequently re-cycled to purchase US Treasury bonds—would 
had contributed less to the financial crisis than a dollar saved. 
 
3.2. Asia and the Global Savings Glut 
 
A more common focus in discussions of how macroeconomic policies lead 
to the financial crisis is the so-called “global savings glut” first discussed by 
Ben Bernanke in a famous 2005 speech. After the Asian financial crisis of 
the late 1990s, many of the affected countries adopted policies to encourage 
savings and used the subsequent current account surpluses to build up large 
stocks of foreign exchange reserves that could be used as a buffer against 
capital outflows in any future crisis. 
 
The green line in Figure 3 shows how the savings rates of emerging markets 
grew steadily during the decade leading up to the financial crisis. The red 
line in the figure also shows how the savings rate of Middle Eastern 




However, despite the significant attention paid to these developments, the 
global savings “glut” was, at most, a relatively modest phenomenon. The 
countries that engaged in these increased savings levels accounted for a 
relatively small fraction of GDP and much of this increase was offset by 
lower savings rates in advanced countries. Overall, according to the IMF, the 
global savings rate rose from 20.7 percent in 2002 to 24.5 percent in 2007. 
                                                 
2 The data in Figure 3 come from IMF’s World Economic Outlook Database. The composition of the 
country groupings can be found at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/01/weodata/groups.htm From the black line in the chart below, one can see that this did not 
correspond to the violent and destabilising upward swing in global savings 









Of course, the reallocation of savings around the world undoubtedly had 
impacts upon specific financial markets around the world. For example, the 
big increase in foreign official purchases of longer-term US Treasury bonds 
(mostly from Asia) most likely contributed to keeping down yields on these benchmark instruments.
3   And this, in turn, would have contributed to 
keeping US mortgage rates low and thus helping to fuel the housing bubble.  
 
My reading of the evidence, however, is that the effect of official purchases 
on longer-term Treasury yields was probably quite modest. On balance, 
then, I think it is unlikely that lower savings rates in developing countries 
would have prevented the global financial crisis.  
 
Furthermore, even if Asian purchases of Treasury bonds had an effect on 
long-term interest rates, it was still well within the power of the US Federal 
Reserve to counteract such effects via its control over short term rates. This, 
of course, brings up the question of whether US monetary policy was too 
accommodative in the period prior to the crisis. The answer to this question 
is undoubtedly yes. However, this is because the easy credit conditions 
generated by monetary policy contributed to the housing bubble and not 
because of inflows of foreign capital.  
 
4. The Future for Policy Co-Ordination  
 
The G20 Pittsburgh communiqué from September of last year contained a 
number of references to global imbalances. With many influential voices 
blaming global imbalances for the financial crisis, there will be calls for 
greater co-ordination of macroeconomic policies to reduce imbalances. 
 
                                                 
3 See Warnock and Warnock (2009). Much of the commentary on the potential problems associated with global 
imbalances will undoubtedly focus on the continued risk of a “dollar crisis”, 
a scenario that many had focused on prior to 2007. According to this 
scenario, foreign investors will, at some point, cease to want to accumulate 
further US assets and with a decline in the dollar required to facilitate a 
decline in the current account deficit, there could be a sort of “sudden stop” 
in which the dollar drops sharply and interest rates on US debt instruments 
need to rise rapidly to compensate for the exchange rate depreciation. 
Potentially, this scenario could lead to a US-lead global recession.
4  
 
The dollar crisis scenario is something that could still come to pass. 
However, it seems less likely as of now. Firstly, as Figure 1 shows, there 
already has been something of a sudden stop in the US current account 
deficit, though this has been as a consequence of the crisis rather than as a 
cause. A sharp decline in imports outpacing an also sharp decline in exports 
has lead to the current account deficit’s share of GDP almost halving in size 
from its peak in 2006. On the capital account side, there has been a dramatic 
reduction in private purchases of US agency and corporate bonds, though 
foreign purchases of Treasury debt have been maintained.
5  
 
Secondly, we have learned something from the recent crisis about the 
behaviour of international capital markets during a global crisis. The 
mechanism emphasised in the dollar crisis story failed to materialise. 
Investors flocked towards US Treasuries, interest rates on these bonds fell 
and the dollar appreciated. This may cast doubt on whether the “dollar 
                                                 
4 See for instance Roubini and Setser (2004) and Krugman (2007). 




Finally, it can still be argued that the US is still coping very well with the 
burden of its accumulated foreign debts. Figure 4 shows net foreign 
investment income for the US. In other words, it shows income from US 
foreign investments minus payouts to the rest of the world on US assets. 
This series remains positive, reflecting higher returns on US foreign 
investments than foreigners have obtained on their US assets.  
 
 





                                                 
6 Caballero (2009) provides a critical discussion of Obstfeld and Rogoff’s focus on the role of global 
imbalances in generating the financial crisis. These comments are not intended to be critical of the G20’s efforts at greater 
macroeconomic co-ordination. In particular, the G20 process should be used 
to encourage China to let its exchange rate appreciate against the dollar and 
also to take steps to reduce its savings rate. The latter can be achieved for 
instance by modernising its financial markets (so consumers don’t have to 
save in advance to purchase consumer durables) or improving its social 
safety net (to reduce precautionary savings.) These steps would have a 
positive effect on the global economy over the next few years and, just as 
importantly, would improve the welfare of the Chinese people.  
 
These measures are worth taking not because they would reduce global 
imbalances but because they will be good for the world economy in the 
coming years. By the same argument, I don’t recommend a quick 
withdrawal of fiscal and monetary stimulus in the US simply because it 
could help reduce global imbalances. With potential output likely to be 
damaged by the crisis and banks going into a cautious and conservative 
mode, the world economy is facing the prospect of a number of years of 
slow growth. Co-ordination at G20 level should be focused on ensuring that 
the withdrawal of stimulus is gradual and does not harm the global recovery. 
 
5. Conclusions: Focus on Banking Regulation 
 
To conclude, I think it would be a mistake to assign a very important role to 
global imbalances when looking for villains to blame for the financial crisis. 
The large gross capital flows associated with financial globalisation certainly 
played a role in the transmission of the crisis around the world but it is too 
late to put that particular genie back in the bottle, nor is it clear that we would want to do so. However, the net flows associated with current account 
deficits played a minor role in determining the crisis and it is unclear that a 
reversal of many of the macroeconomic policies that caused the global 
imbalances would have prevented the sub-prime meltdown and its 
consequences. 
 
In relation to future global macroeconomic policy, there are strong 
arguments for policy to lean harder against asset price booms that may be 
unsustainable bubbles. There is also room for improved global policy co-
ordination and this co-ordination may lead to reduced global imbalances. 
However, these policy changes are worth taking for the improvements they 
will bring to global economic performance rather than because they will 
reduce the likelihood of future financial crisis of the type just experienced. 
 
Policy in relation to crisis prevention must go straight to the source of the 
problems. Rather than blaming a global savings glut or a “search for yield”, 
it is worth focusing on the regulatory failures that allowed the series of 
incentive problems associated with the infamous toxic sub-prime securities: 
The absence of due diligence in checking documentation associated with the 
originate-to-distribute model of securitisation, the failings of the ratings 
agencies, the reliance on inadequate risk models, and the failure of a 
regulatory approach that placed too much emphasis on risk-weighted capital 
as the measure of the health of financial institutions. 
 
Preventing a repeat of the crisis requires a series of improvements in global 
banking regulations. Capital and liquidity levels need to raised; restrictions 
should be brought in to prevent the wholesale mixing of “utility” and “casino” banking; restrictions on profit-related bonuses for bankers should 
be put in place; and credible solutions need to be found to deal with the 
problem of banks that are “too big to fail.”  This is a daunting agenda for 
global economic policy makers over the next few years. Reducing global 
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